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THE BROWNFIELDS AmT: PROVIDING RELIEF FOR THE
INNOCENT OR NEW HURDLES TO AVOID CERCLA
LIABILITY?
SPENCER M. WIEGARD*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SMALL BUSINESS LIABILITY RELIEF AND
BROWNFIELDS REVITALIZATION ACT
On January 11, 2002, President George W. Bush signed House Bill
2869, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields' Revitalization
Act of 20012 ("Brownfields Act") into law at the Millenium Corporate Center
in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.3 In his remarks before signing the bill,
President Bush recognized the Millennium Corporate Center in which he
stood as a brownfields development success story.' The President stated that
when the steel foundry that had previously sat on the site closed, the site
became a brownfield with no investors willing to risk being held jointly and
severally liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")5 for possible existing hazardous
* Spencer M. Wiegard is a J.D. candidate at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the
College of William and Mary. He received his B.A. from the University of Virginia in 2001.
He would like to thank the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review staff
for all their support and assistance in preparing this Note for publication. He would also like
to thank Michael Wiegard for being the best father and mentor a son could have.
'"A 'brownfield' site is abandoned or underutilized urban property which private sources
will not redevelop due to the reality or just the perception of hazardous waste.., and fear
of attendant liability for environmental remediation or cleanup." John W. Lee & W. Eugene
Seago, Policy Entrepreneurship, Public Choice, and Symbolic Reform Analysis of Section
198, The Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrot or Stick or Just Never Mind?, 26 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 613, 613 (2002).
2 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9628).
3 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Signing of H.R. 2869, The Small
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (Jan. 11, 2002), available at
http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020111-3.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2003).
4 Id. para. 17.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
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waste contamination. It was not until the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), local government, and private investors alleviated concerns about
liability that the site was redeveloped.7 The President continued by heralding
the new bill that he was about to sign, saying that it would provide
"protection against lawsuits to prospective buyers and others who didn't
create the brownfields, but want to help clean them up and develop them,"
adding further, "[w]ith this bill ... [w]e will protect innocent small business
owners and employees from unfair lawsuits, and focus our efforts instead on
actually cleaning up contaminated sites. '
President Bush's enthusiasm exhibited at the bill's signing reflected
the positive view of the Brownfields Act held by some members in the
environmental legal community who believe that the clarifications, new
exemptions, and funding created by the Act offer solutions to environmental
contamination liabilityproblems that have been needed for some time.9 Other
observers, however, believe that while the authors and supporters of the
Brownfields Act intended to provide a simpler, codified escape route for
small businesses seeking to avoid liability, the new amendments to CERCLA
are, in fact, complex, cumbersome, and impose new hurdles for these
businesses to surmount if they are to obtain relief from liability.'
EPA expresses the belief that the Brownfields Act "generally exempts
from liability people that purchase contaminated property if their only basis
9601-9675 (2000).
6 Bush, supra note 3, para. 18.
" Id. para. 17.
8 d. paras. 18, 22.
9 See CERCLA Amendments Include Liability Reforms and Brownfields Money, ENVTL.
UPDATE (Riker Danzig Envtl. Group), Apr. 2002 (suggesting that the Brownfields Act was
"the most important amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act . . . since the 1986 Superfind Amendments and
Reauthorization Act"), available at http://www.riker.com/feature/3476.html#a.
"oSee Timothy Harmon & Karen Williams, Brownfields Revitalization Act: Big Promises Not
Delivered in New Brownfields Law, ENvIRONs (Lane Powell Spears Lubersky LLP, Seattle,
WA), Summer 2002 (suggesting the Brownfields Act fails to live up to its promises),
available at http://www.lanepowell.com/pressroom/ newsletters/detail.asp?xnltypeid= 12&
nlid=318; Daniel M. Steinway, Congress Clarifies Innocent Landowner Defense to
Superfund Liability, AM. LAW. CORP. COUNS. MAG. (Sept. 2002) (asserting that the
Brownfields Act has improved the viability of the "innocent landowner" defense at the cost
of additional burdens on such landowners), reprinted at http://www.kelleydrye.com/
resourcecenter/enviromnental/articles/2002/a02InnocentLandowner.htm.
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for liability [under CERCLA] is as the current owner of a Superfund site.""
Prior to the Brownfields Act, CERCLA generally imposed liability for all
cleanup costs and damages from hazardous materials release events upon
both the current and prior owners of the contaminated site.'" EPA further
suggests that the Brownfields Act "is intended to provide those who purchase
contaminated property after the date of enactment the same sort of protection
from liability that was previously afforded by Prospective Purchaser
Agreements ("PPAs")."' 3 It is the purpose of this Note to examine the flaws
in CERCLA targeted by the Brownfields Act. In particular, this Note will
focus on: (1) the deficiencies in the common law interpretations of the
CERCLA exemption requirements for "innocent purchasers;" and (2) wheth-
er the new statutory responses in the form of the Bona Fide Prospective
Purchaser, De Micromis, and Contiguous Property Owner exemptions, when
coupled with newly authorized funding as well as state and local government
action, will achieve the noble goals set forth by President Bush and EPA.
To provide a proper foundation for this analysis, Part II reviews the
circumstances which led to the initial passage of CERCLA in 1980. This
entails an examination of both the environmental problems facing the nation
in the late 1970s and the limitations of then-existing legal theories under
which those responsible for hazardous waste spills could be held liable for
their actions. After setting the stage for CERCLA, Part IlI examines the
liability and exemption provisions of CERCLA and their limitations, as well
as prior attempts to fix early omissions and ambiguities. This examination
" Envtl. Prot. Agency, Cleanup Enforcement: Brownfields, at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/cleanup/brownfields/index.html (last updated Apr. 8, 2003).
" Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a) (2000).
" Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 11. The EPA defines Prospective Purchaser Agreements
as:
settlement mechanisms used to provide liability relief to a purchaser of
Superfund property prior to acquisition, thus allowing the purchaser to
avoid becoming a potentially responsible owner under the Superfund
liability scheme .... The most common such agreements provide EPA
with a cash payment which goes to partially satisfy EPA's response
expenditures at the property. Other PPAs may provide some specific
response activity such as operation and maintenance or site monitoring,
including an agreement for access and cooperation and exercise of due
care.
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will be followed by a study in Part IV of the new Brownfields Act amend-
ments. The Note will analyze in Part V the differences between the common
law interpretations of the "all appropriate inquiry" element of the "innocent
landowner" defense exemption under CERCLA and the new requirements
under the Brownfields Act to determine the likely future effectiveness of the
new liability exemptions. The Note will provide in Part VI a brief summary
of the new funding for brownfield cleanup authorized by the Brownfields Act
as well as the vital role state and local governments can play in encouraging
the redevelopment of brownfields. This analysis will demonstrate that
although it is too early to determine with certainty if the President's grand
predictions are correct, the Brownfields Act's amendments clarify glaring
ambiguities that existed in CERCLA for over twenty years, properly exempt
individuals from liability who have not been able to escape liability in the
past, and provide guidance to resolve the confusion among the courts
regarding how the CERCLA exemptions should be applied.
When the relief from CERCLA liability that these new exemptions
provide is viewed in tandem with the growing financial and administrative
support provided by federal, state, and local governments, the future of
brownfields is starting to look cleaner.
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR CERCLA
A. Toxic Spills in the Late 1970s
In the late 1970s, the American public saw a number of dangerous
releases of hazardous waste materials, both intentional and unintentional, into
the environment at sites across the nation. 5 Places like Niagara Falls, New
York; Hopewell, Virginia; the Ohio River; Louisville, Kentucky; Guilford,
Indiana; Youngstown, Florida; Brightwater, New York; Pensacola, Florida;
Houston, Texas; and White Rock, Texas were all sites of environmental
disasters involving either the dumping or accidental release of toxic
substances into the local ecosystem.' 6 Perhaps the most infamous of these
"42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (2000).
'5 See JAMES W. MOORMAN, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT: REPORT OF THE
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR RELEASES OF
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 3-9 (1979).16 1d.
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releases is the Love Canal incident in Niagara Falls, New York. During the
Love Canal incident, toxic pesticides dumped at a waste disposal site aban-
doned for two decades migrated into surrounding developed land causing
birth defects and other long-term health hazards to local residents.' 7 Highly
visible hazardous waste release events like Love Canal led to a public outcry
for the federal government to take action to prevent such discharges and
clean up then existing environmental contamination in the interest of
reducing future health risks.'8
During the 1970s, the federal government occupied a minor role in
responding to hazardous waste release incidents, merely providing training
for local personnel to prepare to clean up hazardous materials.' 9 State and
local law enforcement and emergency agencies actually responded to release
events.2" Although a federal response was statutorily provided for in certain
circumstances, such as oil spills in coastal waters or if the President declared
the site a disaster area, local authorities were forced to clean up most release
events.2' It was clear that the federal government needed to respond to this
emerging environmental nightmare.22 This response would require a new
system of holding those responsible for these hazardous waste events liable
for their actions plus provide adequate funding for cleanup and response
costs.
B. Existing Common Law Causes ofAction Used to Impose Liability on
Those Responsible for Hazardous Waste Release Events Prior to
CERCLA
In 1979, the federal government formed an interagency task force
headed by the United States Attorney General to examine the hazardous
waste release problem and the existing law with the goal of constructing a
new federal statute to make up for the deficiencies in the existing response
system.23 The task force found that due to the lack of statutory causes of
action to hold those responsible for hazardous waste releases liable for the
17Id. at6.
" Id. at 1.
'9 Id. at9.
20 Id.
21 MOORMAN, supra note 15, at 9.
22 See id.
23 Id. at 1.
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damage caused by such incidents, common law tort and property theories
served as the only means by which liability could be imposed. 24 Due to the
fact that the magnitude of hazardous material spills only recently garnered
national attention, the common law did not regularly venture into the realm
of the toxic spill and was therefore not well developed in this area, making
it an unwieldy weapon for imposing liability upon toxic-spillers.25 Another
major drawback of the Anglo-American common law system that the task
force perceived as a problem was the wide variation between the common
law holdings among the many different jurisdictions in the United States.26
This lack of uniformity evidenced the need for a standard, statutorily-
imposed theory to hold those responsible for hazardous waste events liable
for the damage they caused.
1. Tort Theories
Prior to the passage of CERCLA, there were two common law tort
theories that provided causes of action to hold tortfeasors or environmental
actors liable for the damage and cleanup costs related to hazardous waste
releases. These theories were negligence and strict liability.
a. Negligence
The tort theory of negligence was one possible cause of action that was
useable against environmental tortfeasors. To meet a negligence standard, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's lack of reasonable care was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries and that the risk of harm to the
plaintiff was foreseeable." Under a negligence analysis, courts typically
balance the risk of public harm against the public utility gleaned from the
tortfeasor's actions.28 Negligence theories of failure to inspect, failure to
warn, negligent product design, and negligent misrepresentation were all
applicable to the manufacturers or sellers of hazardous or potentially
hazardous materials.29 There were problems of proof, however, that rendered
24 Id. at 16-17.
25 Id.
26 Id.
2 7 MOORMAN, supra note 15, at 19.
2 8 Id.
29 Id. at 20-21.
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many negligence causes of action for hazardous release events unsuccessful.
Plaintiffs often had trouble proving fault in a negligence action concerning
toxic dumping where the release or deposit of the hazardous materials
became known decades after the material was deposited, rendering neg-
ligence actions nearly useless. 31 It is also worth noting that it might have been
difficult to prevail on a negligence claim against the tortfeasor where the
discharge was in accordance with then-existing laws and regulations because
of problems proving the existence of a higher duty of care.3'
b. Strict Liability
Strict liability was a more useful theory in this area of environmental
law than negligence because proof of fault is not required to establish a
case. 32 When seeking to impose liability under a strict liability theory,
plaintiffs primarily claimed that a hazardous waste release event resulted
from an abnormally dangerous activity.33 In the abnormally dangerous
activities analysis, a plaintiff need only prove that the activity in question is
"abnormally dangerous" and that this activity caused the harm.34 In the case
of Cities Service Co. v. State, the State of Florida sued the defendant
phosphate mining company for damages resulting from a dam break at a
phosphate settling pond that led to the escape of one billion gallons of
phosphate- contaminated water.35 The phosphate slimes seeped into the Peace
River, killing fish and damaging the ecosystem.36 The court in Cities Service
Co. applied the strict liability doctrine of the seminal British torts case of
Rylands v. Fletcher, where the defendant was strictly liable for the leak of
water from a reservoir into a mine shaft because the activity of storing water
30 See id. at 25.
11 Id. at 19.
32 Id.
33 MOORMAN, supra note 15, at 21.
34 Id.
" Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
36 Id.
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was a non-natural use of the property.37 The Cities Service Co. court used a
six-factor balancing test to determine that the activity of storing phosphate-
laden water was abnormally dangerous, and found the defendant strictly
liable on summary judgment.38
The interagency task force recognized that while this abnormally
dangerous activities analysis was the most promising theory in the pre-
CERCLA years, courts like the Florida District Court of Appeals in Cities
Service Co. had added a balancing of the equities test to determine if the
public benefitted more from the activity than the harm, rendering the theory
less useful.39 At that time, no state had adopted a common law rule holding
that the manufacture of chemicals was per se abnormally dangerous.40
Without such a holding, the issue of abnormal danger had to be litigated in
every case.4
2. Property Rights Theories
Common law theories based on the invasion of property (trespass) or
interference with the use of property (nuisance) also proved to be useful in
imposing liability on releasers of hazardous waste.42
a. Nuisance
The most commonly used property law theory to impose liability on
releasers of hazardous wastes was that of nuisance.43 Nuisance law can be
split into two separate categories, public and private; the former generally
requiring that a public official bring the action and assert a right enjoyed by
the general public, while private nuisance is merely the "unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of land." Bringing a nuisance
action for the release of hazardous waste, however, can be difficult under
either doctrine. In Page v. Niagara Chemical Division of Food Machinery
37 Id.
38 Id. at 803-04.
39 MOORMAN, supra note 15, at 21.
40 Id. at 22.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 17.431 Id. at 23.
44 Id.
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and Chemical Corp., the plaintiffs failed on their claims of both public and
private nuisance.4 5 The plaintiffs sued to shut down the chemical plant
located adjacent to the rail yard where they worked on the theories that the
chemicals and dust the plant emitted constituted both a public and private
nuisance.46 The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint
because as employees, the plaintiffs did not have a sufficient interest in the
property to maintain a private nuisance cause of action, and failed to
demonstrate a sufficient special injury to justify their action as private
individuals for public nuisance.47 Under the nuisance doctrine, the court also
must balance the equities component during the determination of an
appropriate remedy.48
Traditionally, courts are reluctant to use private nuisance actions to
further public concerns, such as fighting air pollution. The Court of Appeals
of New York in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. heard a case involving a
private nuisance action by the neighbors of a cement plant that emitted dirt,
smoke, and vibrations.49 The court suggested its reluctance to use common
law causes of action to further environmental policies in stating:
[a] court should not try to [fight air pollution] on its own as
a by-product of private litigation and it seems manifest that
the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited
nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay
down and implement an effective policy for the elimination
of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of
one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for govern-
ment and should not thus be undertaken as an incident to
solving a dispute between property owners and a single
cement plant .... 50
4 Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla.
1953).
46 Id. at 383.
47 Id. at 383-84.
48 MOORMAN, supra note 15, at 24.
41 Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
50 Id.
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b. Trespass
Trespass was the second property rights-based tort theory that served as
a possible cause of action to impose liability on those responsible for
hazardous waste release events. Although trespass and nuisance are very
similar concepts, the fundamental difference between the two is that trespass
requires a physical invasion onto property, which could include hazardous
waste releases, while the invasion by microscopic particles could constitute
a nuisance."' In Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., the Oregon Supreme Court
held that fluoride particles from an aluminum plant's emissions constituted
a trespass when they settled on the plaintiff's land and rendered the land and
drinking water unusable. 2
3. Common Law Short Comings in Dealing with the Release of
Hazardous Materials
In addition to the lack of uniformity between state common law causes
of action used to hold those responsible for hazardous waste release events
liable prior to 1980, the interagency task force recognized additional limi-
tations on the effectiveness of common law solutions. One such problem
stemmed from the fact that the harmful effects of most hazardous waste
releases did not become apparent until years after the event, long after the
statutes of limitations for these common law causes of action ran.53 Difficulty
in proving causation and the general complexity of the scientific issues
concerning hazardous waste releases created daunting hurdles to imposing
liability on those responsible for such events.54 After examining the state and
federal statutes that did impose liability on responsible parties and assigned
clean-up responsibilities, the interagency task force laid out a plan for the
creation of the Superfund, a plan which the federal government adopted with
the passage of CERCLA in 1980."
5' MOORMAN, supra note 15, at 24.
52 Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 342 P.2d 790, 791-94 (1959).
53 MOORMAN, supra note 15, at 18.
" Id. at 19.
.5 Id. at 27-40, 46-152; see also Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
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III. THE PASSAGE OF CERCLA
In the fall of 1980, after months of work, Congress passed CERCLA in
response to the findings of the interagency task force report and growing
public concern that those responsible for future environmental catastrophes
would go unpunished.16 The Act "authorize[d] the United States or a state to
bring actions to recover costs incurred in responding to releases of hazardous
substances,"" and also provided for "cost recovery suits by private parties in
certain circumstances.""8 CERCLA created a trust fund, called the Superfund,
from which EPA received funds to find and clean up contaminated brown-
fields.59 Under CERCLA, by using the Superfund,
EPA can pay for cleanup when parties responsible for the
contamination cannot be located or are unwilling or unable to
perform the work. EPA can also take legal action to force
parties responsible for contamination to cleanup the site or
reimburse the Federal government for the cost of the
cleanup. 60
56 1 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.1 (1992).
17 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) broadly defines the term "release" as:
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the environment
(including the abandonment or discarding ofbarrels, containers, and other
closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to
persons solely within a workplace . . . (B) emissions from the engine
exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline
pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special
nuclear material from a nuclear incident ... (D) the normal application of
fertilizer.
Id.
" 4 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND LITIGATION
§ 14.01 (Susan M. Cooke & Christopher P. Davis eds., 1986); see also 42 U.S.C § 9607(a).
59 RONALD H. ROSENBERG, COMMUNITY RESOURCE GUIDE FOR BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOP-
MENT 27 (2d ed. 2002) (citing OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, NO. 542/B-97/001, TOOL KIT OF INFORMATION RESOURCES FOR
BROWNFIELDS INVESTIGATION AND CLEANUP (1997)).
6 Id.
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A. Enforcement Actions
CERCLA provides several different types of enforcement actions. The
federal government can sue to obtain reimbursement for cleanup expen-
ditures paid out of the Superfund or it can force a potentially responsible
party ("PRP") to clean up contaminated sites. 61 State governments enjoy the
same power to sue PRPs to recoup expenses paid in cleaning up Brownfield
sites; however, they do not possess the power to sue for injunctive relief to
compel PRPs to cleanup contaminated sites.62 CERCLA section 107(a)(4)
provides that any "other person" may sue to obtain costs expended for
cleanup of contaminated sites. 63 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the phrase "other person" includes local govern-
ments.' While other persons, including state and local governments and
private parties, can sue to obtain reimbursement for cleanup expenses, they
cannot seek an injunction to force a PRP to undertake remediation of a
contaminated site.
B. Imposition ofLiability
CERCLA imposes a liability for cleaning up contaminated brownfield
sites upon PRPs.65 CERCLA defined PRPs as:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by
any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
61 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607; 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 3.2.
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a); 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 3.3.
63 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 3.4(A).
See Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1141-42 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
65 See I TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 3.5.
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such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance
66
Courts have been willing to "pierce the corporate veil" in holding
corporate shareholders, including parent corporations, liable in Superfund
recuperation actions, if the plaintiff convinces the court either (1) that the
corporation was merely a fraudulent front to limit shareholder liability, or (2)
that limiting shareholder liability would lead to an inequitable result.6' In
Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, Inc., the trial court ignored
the corporate form and imposed CERCLA liability upon the defendant
corporation's shareholders. 68 The court reasoned that piercing the corporate
veil was equitable because the "[d]efendants' failure to: adequately capitalize
West Coast Valet/Electronic Valet; issue stock; maintain minutes and ade-
quate records; hold board meetings; and observe corporate formalities,
constitutes such a unity of interest of the corporation and the individuals that
the separate personalities of the corporation and individuals no longer
exist. ' 69 Courts also consider many other factors when determining whether
to disregard the standard limited liability protection that shareholders of a
corporation typically enjoy.70
C. Exemptions and Defensesfor PRPs Under CERCLA
CERCLA section 107(b) established three main defenses to Superfund
liability, stating:
642 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
67 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, at 178.
68 Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., Inc., No. C-89-0947-SC, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5630, at *21-22 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 1991), vacated on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1015 (9th
Cir. 1993).69 Id. at *21.
70 For a laundry list of the various factors considered by courts when determining whether
to "pierce the corporate veil," see 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, at § 3.6(c)(1).
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There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section
for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an
employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ... if the
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the
characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions.7'
Courts have interpreted the Act of God and Act of War defenses in only
a handful of cases. Courts interpreted the Act of God provision rather
narrowly to include only events where "the release of waste as opposed to
another event leading to the incurrence of response costs, was due solely to
an Act of God, was not foreseeable, and consequently was not preventable
by an act of man. ' 72 In United States v. Multi-Chem, Inc., the defendants
unsuccessfully argued against the government's motion for summary judg-
ment by claiming that because they had exercised due care in preventing
leaks or spills from their chemical facility, the fact that a nearby pond
became contaminated implied that this release was the result of an Act of
God.73 The Act of War defense also has seldom reached a courtroom. 74
7142 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
72 1 ToPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, at § 5.3 (citations omitted).
71 United States v. Multi-Chem, Inc., [1990] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,553, 20,
553 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 1989) ("[T]he existence of care in the ordinary course of conducting
one's business does not, without more, imply that the hazardous condition resulted from an
act of God.").
14 See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 5.4 ("As far as we are aware, the Act of War
defense has been raised and argued by the parties in only a few reported cases.").
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Unlike the first two defenses, the "sole cause" or "third-party defense"
from CERCLA section 107(b) has been a commonly asserted claim.7"
In order to establish the "sole cause" or "third-party" defense,
the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) the release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance and the resulting damages were caused solely by an
act or omission of a third-party; (2) the third-party's act or
omission did not occur in connection with a contractual,
employment, or agency relationship (either direct or indirect)
with the defendant; (3) the defendant exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance; and (4) the defendant took
precautions against the third-party's foreseeable acts or
omissions and the foreseeable consequences resulting
therefrom.76
Because this defense requires such an exacting standard of proof, in almost
every case where the "third-party" defense has been raised, the defendant has
been unable to survive plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.77
D. The Innocent Landowner Defense
The original CERCLA bill, when passed in 1980, failed to differentiate
between "innocent" and "guilty" owners of sites containing hazardous
substances for the purpose of liability.78 In 1986, to correct this situation,
Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA").79 Instead of amending the liability provisions of these basic
defenses for PRPs, SARA amended the definition of "contractual
75 1 Id. § 5.5(A).
76 1 Id.
77 1 Id. (citing as successful use of the "third-party" defense in surviving plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment, Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y.
1990); United States v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Mirabile [1985] 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)).
78 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, at 433.
71 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9628 (2000)).
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relationship" in CERCLA section 101(35) 82a to allow a PRP to escape the
"contractual relationship exception""0 to the "third-party" defense by demon-
strating: (1) the purchaser did not know or have reason to know the site was
contaminated at the time of purchase; (2) the purchaser made "all appropriate
inquiries" into the site prior to purchase; and (3) the purchaser exercised due
care with respect to contamination when it was discovered."' Together these
three components constitute what has become known as the "innocent
landowner" defense. 2 A PRP may assert the "innocent landowner" defense
to avoid CERCLA liability if the landowner can prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that, in the most basic of terms, "[the PRP] acquired the
property without reason to know that a hazardous substance was disposed of
on the property." 3 SARA did not, however, define what steps a prospective
purchaser would have to take to meet the "all appropriate inquiries" re-
quirement. 4 In fact, the legislative history shows that Congress intended to
impose a sliding scale of investigative duty based on the purchaser's
sophistication rather than adopting any one uniform standard. 5
E. Standards of Liability
Though the word "strict" does not appear in the liability provisions of
CERCLA, Congress defined "liability" by reference to the Clean Water Act
("CWA").86 Courts have universally accepted that Congress intended this
8" The "contractual relationship exception" to the "third-party" or "sole cause" of harm
defense eliminates any individual, such as a subsequent owner of the site, with a direct or
indirect contractual relationship with a PRP from using this defense. See 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b)(3).
811 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, at § 5.6 (outlining these three elements from 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)).
82 See 1 id. § 5.6.
83 ROSENBERG, supra note 59, at 41.
84 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-28
(2000)).
85 See I TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, at § 5.6; cf JEFFERY C. FORT ET AL., BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFFAIRS, CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES NO. 57-2ND, AVOIDING LIABILITY FOR
HAZARDOUS WASTE: RCRA, CERCLA, AND RELATED CORPORATE LAW ISSUES, A-108
(2003) (discussing courts' applications of the "innocent landowner" defense in the context
of successor liability for corporate asset purchases).
86 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9601(32) (2000); see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000).
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reference to incorporate CWA's strict liability standard into CERCLA.87 The
term "joint and several" also was omitted from the liability portion of
CERCLA after some extensive debate.8 Following the decision of the
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in the case of United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,89 courts have widely accepted that the principle ofjoint
and several liability could be imposed in CERCLA litigation.9" Joint and
several liability scares away potential purchasers of brownfields because the
current owner of a contaminated site is the most obvious defendant in a
CERCLA suit, and if sued, the current owner becomes potentially liable for
the entire cost of remediation for past pollution.9 If any PRP can be held
liable for the entire amount of the cleanup costs, the current owner becomes
especially vulnerable when previous owners cannot be found or have gone
defunct. Even if the current owner is arguably "innocent," the current owner
has the burden to prove that it is not a PRP.92 Meeting this burden can impose
significant litigation costs on current owners of contaminated sites.93 The
only limitation on the imposition of joint and several liability is where the
amount of environmental damage caused by each PRP can be firmly cal-
culated and the liability can be apportioned appropriately among them.94
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Brownfields Act: Solving Problems with CERCLA
Implementation and judicial interpretation of CERCLA following the
enactment of the SARA amendments has served to point out additional
problems with the rules of liability and the application of various exemptions
87 See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 4.2.
88See l id. § 4.4.
9 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
90 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, at § 4.4(0) & n.36 (discussing several cases involving
the application ofjoint and several liability under CERCLA).
9' See RONALD H. ROSENBERG, CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, COLL. OF WM. & MARY,
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: CLEANING UP CONTAMINATED SITES FOR COMMUNITY
RENEWAL 12 (1999).
92 See id. at 14.
93 See id. (noting that courts within the Fourth Circuit narrowly construe the elements of this
defense, making it difficult for current owners to meet their burden of proof).
94/d. at 12 ("Each party may be liable for only a portion of the cleanup costs if there is some
reasonable way of allocating the amount of damage caused by particular parties.").
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and expenses. The Brownfields Act was written with the intention of fixing
these further flaws in CERCLA.
1. New Exemptions in the Brownfields Act
a. The De Micromis Exemption
Prior to the passage of the Brownfields Act, a PRP could be liable under
CERCLA even if the amount of on-site pollution the PRP contributed was
minimal.95 In United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., Inc., the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that EPA had the authority
under CERCLA section 122(g) 96 to enter into "de micromis settlements" with
a PRP if the amount of hazardous waste contribution by the PRP and the
toxic effects are minimal when compared to the aggregate pollution at the
site.97 Although settlements with de micromis contributors were authorized
in CERCLA, these PRPs were not exempted from Superfund liability.
Section 102 of the Brownfields Act amended CERCLA section 107 to
exempt from Superfund liability any PRP who contributed less than 110
gallons of liquid or 200 pounds of solid waste materials if the pollution
occurred before April 1, 2001.98 This exception, however, is not available
where:
the materials containing hazardous substances ... [1] have
contributed significantly or could contribute significantly,
either individually or in the aggregate, to the cost of the
response action or natural resource restoration with respect to
the facility; or... [2] the person has failed to comply with an
information request or administrative subpoena issued by the
President under this Act or has impeded; or [3] is impeding,
through action or inaction, the performance of a response
" See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
96 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1996).
97 United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., Inc., Civ. Action No. 1 :CV-93-1482, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22573, at *10, 29-30 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29,1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)
(1996)).
9' Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
§ 102, 115 Stat. 2356, 2356 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9628).
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action or natural resource restoration with respect to the
facility; or ... [4] a person has been convicted of a criminal
violation for the conduct to which the exemption would
apply, and that conviction has not been vitiated on appeal or
otherwise.99
Under this new de micromis exception, a purchaser who cooperates in
an investigation into the site and complies with government information
requests can escape Superfund liability, even though the purchaser is
responsible for some portion of the dumping. This exemption will serve its
purpose--eliminating liability for minimal contributions to pollution. At the
same time, this exception will not be subject to rampant abuse because of the
provision that excludes a PRP if the small amount of waste she contributes
will create a costly or dangerous cleanup project. While a PRP who con-
tributed less than the specified amount of waste is presumptively not liable,
this exception from liability will be unavailable if the waste was especially
harmful or hazardous and thus contributed significantly to the cleanup.
b. Municipal Solid Waste Exemption
The Brownfields Act also exempts certain PRPs and small businesses
that contribute municipal solid waste.'° As with the de micromis exception,
a PRP who otherwise would qualify for the municipal solid waste exception
may not receive the benefit of the exception if the PRP's waste creates a
costly or dangerous cleanup project. 1 This exemption covers most private
individuals and many small businesses from unwittingly being held liable
under CERCLA for carelessly throwing out contaminants with the weekly
trash collection.
99 1d. § 102, 115 Stat. at 2357.
'00 Id. § 102, 115 Stat. at 2357-58. Municipal solid waste is defined by the statute as waste
"generated by a household" or is "generated by a commercial, industrial, or institutional
entity, to the extent that the waste material ... is essentially the same as waste normally
generated by a household ... [or] is collected and disposed of with other municipal solid
waste . . . ." Id. § 102, 115 Stat. at 2358.
'
0
'Id. § 102, 115 Stat. at 2358.
2003]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
c. Contiguous Property Owner Exemption
The addition of a contiguous property owner exemption relieves from
liability property owners whose land is or may become contaminated by the
migration of pollutants from neighboring land. 2 While this provision might
seem at first glance to grant sweeping relief from CERCLA liability, a
number of restrictions limit its application.0 3 A land owner qualifies for this
exemption if the land owner:
[1] did not cause or contribute to the release or threatened
release
[2] is not potentially liable or affiliated with any other person
potentially liable
[3] exercises appropriate care in respect to the release
[4] provides full cooperation, assistance, and access to per-
sons authorized to undertake the response action and natural
resource restoration
[5] complies with all land use controls and does not impede
the performance of any institutional controls
[6] complies with all information requests
[7] provides all the legally required notices regarding releases
of hazardous substances [and]
[8] conducted all appropriate inquiry at time of purchase and
did not know or have reason to know of contamination[.]"0
Those who believe that the Brownfields Act fails to meet its goals look
to these eight restrictions as a demonstration that the Act is, in fact, more
limiting than the previous common law rules."0 5 The contiguous property
owner exemption also only covers pollution through ground water, and fails
to recognize migrating pollution through soil leeching. 0 6 Adoption of a
contiguous property owner exemption, however, was necessary to protect
'
02 See id. § 221, 115 Stat. at 2368-70.
103 See id. § 102, 115 Stat. at 2369.
'o Envtl. Prot. Agency, Summary of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/2869sun.htm (last updated
July 7, 2003) (discussing section 221).
loS See Harmon & Williams, supra note 10.
16See id.
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property owners, wholly unaffiliated with their polluting neighbors, whose
property becomes contaminated by no fault of their own. Although the
Brownfields Act establishes a number of restrictions on what a landowner
can and cannot do when trying to claim the contiguous property owner
exception, this amendment is a welcome addition to CERCLA because it fills
a long-existing gap.
d. Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser Exemption
The Browfields Act also amends CERCLA to exempt from liability
bona fide prospective purchasers, defined as a person (or a tenant of a
person) who acquires ownership of a facility after the date of the enactment
of this section and who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence"0 7 that
"all disposal took place before the purchase,"' 8 and that the purchaser:
[1] made all appropriate inquiry
[2] ... exercises appropriate care with respect to any release
[3] provides full cooperation, assistance, and access to
persons authorized to undertake response actions or natural
resource restoration
[4] complies with land use restrictions and does not impede
performance of institutional controls
[5] complies with all information requests
[6] provides all legally required notices regarding releases of
hazardous substances [and]
[7] ... is not potentially liable or affiliated with any other
person potentially liable[.]"40
The qualifications under the bona fide prospective purchaser exemption
are substantially similar to those in the contiguous properties exemption. "0
The "innocent landowner" defense, however, only applies to owners who did
not know and should not have known that the property they were acquiring
o See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, § 221, 115 Stat.
at 2370.
108 Id.
"o Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 104 (discussing section 222).
"
0 See Harmon & Williams, supra note 10.
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had or could be contaminated."' Under the new bona fide prospective
purchaser exemption, owners who discovered site contamination or the
possibility thereof prior to purchase, and took action to clean up or prevent
the contamination from getting worse, will be protected. The purpose of
exempting those prospective purchasers who have conscientiously
investigated the possibility or existence of contamination on a site is to
eliminate the need for these prospective purchasers to enter into Prospective
Purchaser Agreements ("PPAs") with EPA. "2 PPAs are "settlements with the
purchasers of contaminated property which then act as covenants not to
sue.''13 Under new PPA criteria adopted in 1999, EPA considers the
following five criteria in deciding whether to enter into a PPA with a
prospective purchaser:
[1] An EPA action at the facility has been taken, is ongoing,
or is anticipated to be undertaken by the agency
[2] The Agency should receive a substantial benefit either in
the form of a direct benefit for cleanup, or as an indirect
public benefit in combination with a reduced direct benefit to
EPA
[3] The continued operation of the facility or new site
development, with the exercise of due care, will not aggrevate
or contribute to the existing contamination or interfere with
EPA's response action
[4] The continued operation or new development of the
property will not pose health risks to the community and
those persons likely to be present at the site [and]
[5] The prospective purchaser is financially viable[.] 1 4
In particular, if the prospective purchaser could demonstrate that EPA
would receive a "substantial benefit" from the transaction, that the site could
"' See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
"
2 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 11 (discussing PPAs).
113 ROSENBERG, supra note 59, at 53.
114 Id. at 55 (citing MARK S. DENNISON, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: PROGRAMS AND
STRATEGIES FOR REHABILITATING CONTAMINATED REAL ESTATE 9 (Government Institutes
Inc. 1998); Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective
Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed.
Reg. 34,792, 34,792-95 (July 3, 1995)).
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be developed by the prospective purchaser without causing additional con-
tamination, that the site posed no health hazard, and that the prospective
purchaser had the means to provide adequate consideration, this purchaser
could obtain EPA's promise not to sue the purchaser under CERCLA. "' EPA
is required to publish notices of proposed PPAs in the Federal Register to
inform the community." 6 The notice of proposed settlement between EPA
and the City of Phoenix concerning "[t]he Motorola 52nd Street Superfund
Site" details the typical forms of consideration a purchaser can provide in a
PPA. 17 In that case, EPA granted the City of Phoenix a covenant not to sue
under CERCLA for the development of the Superfund site in an effort to
expand Sky Harbor Airport in exchange for $10,000 and an agreement (1) to
allow EPA access to the site for cleanup and (2) for the City of Phoenix to
cooperate with any EPA requests to implement measures to stop the spread
of the contamination."18
Some legal scholars suggest that the restrictions in the Brownfields Act
will serve to prevent most brownfield sites from achieving bona fide pro-
spective purchaser status and thereby may prevent further brownfield de-
velopment by discouraging prospective purchasers.119 If, on the other hand,
the bona fide prospective purchaser exemption proves to be usable by
conscientious property owners, it will allow individuals who exercise care in
discovering contamination problems and take steps to contain these problems
to protect themselves from CERCLA liability without having to resort to
PPAs. This exemption could have a profound effect on achieving significant
gains in national brownfields redevelopment if it proves to be workable.
It is also necessary to note that the bona fide purchaser exemption is an
affirmative defense to a CERCLA action. Because the bona fide purchaser
exemption only serves as an affirmative defense, it is raised in response to
the initiation of litigation against the landowner. As an affirmative defense,
"' See ROSENBERG, supra note 59, at 55-59.
116 Id. at 58-59 (noting, however, that the Federal Register publication does not always
provide adequate notice).
"17 See Motorola 52nd Street Superfund Site, Phoenix, Arizona; Notice of Proposed
Administrative Settlement, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,832 (Sept. 5, 2002).
118 Id.
'9 See Harmon & Williams, supra note 10 ("The requirement that the owner or prospective
owner take reasonable steps to stop continuing releases, prevent future releases, and prevent
human and other exposure to the hazardous substances may be burdensome. The nature and
extent of the required action by the owner is not defined.").
1492003]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
the defendant must raise this exemption in her answer."' Any failure to raise
this defense waives its use.' 2' PPAs, on the other hand, secure liability relief
for the landowner before the property is purchased.122 Application of the bona
fide purchaser exemption may require the landowner to incur the cost and
time of responding to litigation. Although Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") practices like arbitration and negotiated settlements have been used
in CERCLA actions with up to 1200 parties,'23 obtaining relief from liability
through ADR also consumes the landowner's time and money. The bona fide
prospective purchaser exemption is the codification of EPA's desire to
provide liability relief to conscientious landowners who knew at the time of
sale that their new property was or could be considered a Superfund site,
without having to go through the relatively cumbersome practice of nego-
tiating and granting PPAs.
2. All Appropriate Inquiries Requirement Defined: Changes in the
Innocent Landowner Defense
Section 223 of the Brownfields Act finally defines the phrase "all
appropriate inquiries" for purposes of the innocent landowner defense qual-
ifications established by SARA. 24 The Act directs EPA to establish new
standards and practices for the "all appropriate inquires" requirement by
2004 using a number of statutorily defined considerations.' In the
meantime, the Act provides two interim definitions of "all appropriate
inquiries."' 26 For any purchase that took place before May 31, 1997, the "all
appropriate inquiries" standard is to incorporate the following five factors:
[1] any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of
the defendant;
120 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
121 See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b).
122 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
123See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Cleanup Enforcement: Alternative Dispute Resolution athttp:/f
www.epa.gov/ conipliance/cleanup/adr/index.htm (last updated June 26, 2003).
124 Harmon & Williams, supra note 10.
125 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118,
§ 223(2), 115 Stat. 2356, 2373 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(ii)-
(iii)).
126 Id.
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[2] the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the
property, if the property was not contaminated;
[3] commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information
about the property;
[4] the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of
contamination at the property; and
[5] the ability of the defendant to detect the contamination by
appropriate inspection. 7
These factors are merely a restatement of those established in SARA. 2 8
The statute adopted a simpler interim "all appropriate inquiries" standard for
purchases after May 31, 1997. Congress codified the American Society for
Testing and Materials' ("ASTM")129 "Phase I Assessment" as the standard
governing these more recent purchases of affected land. 30 The ASTM Phase
I Assessment "must be preformed by an environmental professional," and
"includes a records review, site reconnaissance, interviews, and reports. ' '131
It is important to note that no actual soil or groundwater testing is required
under this standard. Basically, the ASTM Phase I Assessment is a back-
ground check and visual inspection for possible pollution. EPA recently
clarified that ASTM Standard E1527-00 (the most recent form of the Phase
I Assessment) is the current "all appropriate inquiry" standard.'
Setting the ASTM Phase I Assessment as the second interim standard
may have removed the ambiguity from the interpretation of the phrase "all
appropriate inquiries," but now no lesser level of inquiry will suffice. Where
a purchaser acted in good faith but had a lesser inspection or assessment
performed, she cannot use the innocent landowner defense. Prospectively,
this amendment may make the application of the appropriate inquiries re-
quirement uniform and provide a "safe harbor" for property purchasers. It
127 Id. § 223(2), 115 Stat. at 2374.
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (2000).
29 ASTM "has developed widely accepted standards for evaluating environmental
liabilities," and worked with "the EPA to develop standards for Brownfields redevelopment."
ROSENBERG, supra note 59, at 230.
12' Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act § 223(2), 115 Stat.
at 2374 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(13)(iv)(II)).
131 ROSENBERG, supra note 59, at 231 (citations omitted).
13 Clarification to Interim Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiry Under
CERCLA, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,888 (May 9, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 312).
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should not be overlooked, however, that there are probably landowners who
had inspections performed on their property before purchase that do not
meet ASTM Phase I Assessment standard who will still be susceptible to
CERCLA liability.
The Brownfields Act also established several new substantive con-
ditions for invoking the innocent landowner defense. In addition to making
all appropriate inquiries, the purchaser must have taken "reasonable steps to
[ 1 ] stop any continuing release; [2] prevent any threatened future release; and
[3] prevent or limit any human, environmental, or natural re-source exposure
to any previously released hazardous substance. ' 33 These requirements
merely ensure that when contamination is discovered at a site, the innocent
landowner must act to prevent further environmental damage. Innocent
landowner apathy that leads to further environmental damage would hardly
justify granting such a landowner relief from liability.
IV. ANALYSIS: WILL THE BROWNFIELDS ACT LIVE UP TO GOVERNMENT
PROMISES?
A. Pre-Brownfields Act Case Law: The Ambiguity of "All Appropriate
Inquiries"
1. A Duty to Inspect?
In the years since the adoption of SARA amendments to CERCLA,
there have been a number of cases where the purchaser of a contaminated site
has attempted to escape liability through the innocent landowner defense.
Some courts have held that although there was no defined standard for the
"all appropriate inquiries" required under the "innocent landowner" defense,
if the landowner conducted no inspection before the purchase, she could not
claim the defense.'34 Some courts went further to hold that the "all ap-
propriate inquiries" requirement imposed an affirmative duty on prospective
purchasers both to inspect the site and to investigate possible previous
33 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act § 223(2), 115 Stat.
at 2373 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(i)(II)).
134 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, §5.6 (citing United States v. Serafini, 791 F. Supp. 107,
108 (M.D. Pa. 1990)).
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contamination. 135 The new definition of "all appropriate inquiries" that
requires landowners to meet ASTM Phase I Assessment clearly codifies the
existence of an affirmative duty on prospective landowners to inspect sites
for possible environmental contamination before purchasing.
2. Inconsistency Between Standards
In addition to codifying an affirmative duty on the part of the purchaser
to inspect a piece of property for either actual or possible contamination, the
Brownfields Act further establishes a clear standard regarding the level of
inquiry required for a purchaser to remain innocent, or bona fide. 36 Before
the Brownfields Act, courts applied a sliding scale standard for the required
level of inquiry to determine who was an innocent landowner, applying more
stringent standards to more sophisticated landowners.
37
In Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority v. American
Premier Underwriters, Inc., the defendant appealed the district court's ruling
for the plaintiff on several grounds, including the allegation that the district
court had erred in holding that the plaintiff was protected from CERCLA
liability under the innocent landowner defense. 138 In its decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that a "liable facility owner or
operator can escape liability by demonstrating that the release or threatened
release was caused solely by an act or omission of a third party.' 39 The
Court of Appeals intertwined the third-party defense from section 107(b)(3)
and the "innocent landowner" defense from section 101(35)(a) in a most
confusing way. 4° The Court of Appeals stated the appropriate rule for
determining "all appropriate inquiries" at the time, but never discussed this
provision.'4 Instead, the court recognized that the plaintiff had no warning
"1 Id. § 5.6 (citing In re Sterling Steel Treating Inc., 94 B.R. 924, 930 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1989)).
136 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act § 223(2), 115 Stat.
at 2373-74 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 9601(35)(B)).
117 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 5.6 (citing Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc.,
1988 HWLR 12,533 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1988).
13S Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d
534, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2001).
,3 Id. at 547-48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000); United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204
F.3d 698, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2000)).
4' American Premier Underwriters, 240 F.3d at 548.
141 Id. at 547 n.5.
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that the containers of hazardous waste were buried at the site and could not
have anticipated the accident which lead to the leak, but chose to reject the
plaintiff's "innocent landowner" defense on the grounds that the plaintiffs
lack of action to prevent the spread of the spill until almost a year after the
accident constituted a failure to exercise due care under the statute. 42
Decisions such as this one were not surprising due to the lack of specific
guidance from Congress in the form of a "bright line" rule under the defenses
set forth in CERCLA1 43 The court ignored its opportunity to comment on the
level of inquiry the plaintiff undertook prior to the purchase of the property,
focusing instead on the requirements of the "innocent landowner" defense
that required the plaintiff to contain the contamination once discovered.'"
In United States v. CMGD Realty, Co., EPA sued the third-party plain-
tiff to recoup cleanup costs expended from the Superfund and the plaintiff
joined the previous owner for contribution. 45 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the previous owner's purpose in drilling holes into a
landfill did not matter. '46 Any soil investigative procedure, done for whatever
reason, qualified as part of the required "all appropriate inquiries" under the
"innocent landowner" defense.'47 The court remanded the case for trial to
determine if this drilling had been done negligently.4 The court's strange
approach to the application of the "all appropriate inquiries" standard in
CMGD Realty may be due to the fact that the new landowner apparently
bought the property from the previous owner with the understanding that the
site had been used as a landfill and contained hazardous waste. 49 The
reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case illustrates the confusion and
misapplication of the previous "innocent landowner" defense. Today, the
defendants in this case would have to seek protection under the bona fide
prospective purchaser exemption of the Brownfields Act.
As previously noted, applying the all appropriate inquiries standard was
intensely fact-specific before the Brownfields Act adopted ASTM Phase I
142 Id.
'41 See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 56, § 5.6 (citing United States v. Pac. Hide & Fur
Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989)).
144 American Premier Underwriters, 240 F.3d at 548.
145 United States v. CMGD Realty, Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711-13 (3d Cir. 1996).
146 Id. at 722.
14 7 1d.
14 1 Id. at 721-23.
149 Id. at 712.
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Assessment as the uniform standard. Because a non-uniform standard
requires greater fact-finding before a determination may be made, cases of
this type often survived summary judgment motions due to the host of
material issues of fact to be proven at trial. 50 With a uniform standard, such
as the ASTM Phase I Assessment, the defendant merely has to provide
documentation that she had a Phase I Assessment performed before she
purchased the property to prove that all appropriate inquiries were taken.
This standard leaves fewer issues of fact in dispute and allows for more
CERCLA cases where the defendant asserts that she is innocent to be
disposed of by summary judgment, which saves the defendant further
litigation costs.
B. The Contractual Relationship Requirement
In Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution
Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the phrase "in
connection with a contractual relationship," from CERCLA section 107(b)(3)
to require:
more than the mere existence of a contractual relationship
between the owner of land on which hazardous substances are
or have been disposed of and a third party whose act or
omission was the sole cause of the release or threatened
release of such hazardous substances into the environment,
for the landowner to be barred from raising the third-party
defense provided for in that section. In order for the land-
owner to be barred from raising the third-party defense under
such circumstances, the contract between the landowner and
the third party must either relate to the hazardous substances
or allow the landowner to exert some element of control over
the third party's activities. 5'
0 See, e.g., In re Hemmingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 932 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, 204 F. Supp. 2d 318, 332-35 (D.R.I. 2002).
' Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir.
1992).
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This interpretation seems at odds with the statutory definition of the phrase
"contractual relationship," as covering "a land transfer, deed, easement,
lease, or other instrument that occurred 'after the disposal or placement of the
hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility.""' 1 2 The Court of Appeals in
Westwood Pharmaceuticals apparently attempted to further limit the con-
tractual exclusion under SARA to provide relief similar to the standard
ultimately adopted in the Brownfields Act.
In United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., the court instead
concluded that a landowner's contract for purchasing the site from the prior
owner, who caused the contamination, precluded the use of the third party
defense.' 53 The court noted that this conclusion was necessary to give full
effect to the statutory definition of "contractual relationship.' '154 Indeed, the
court went on to observe that "[t]o adopt the interpretation set forth by the
Second Circuit in Westwood would render the explicit language of the
statutory definition inoperative." '155 The opposing interpretations of the con-
tract requirement taken by the courts in Westwood and Domenic Lombardi
Realty illustrate the split in the federal courts that the Brownfield Act was
meant to remedy.
VI. ENCOURAGING BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT
A. New Funding
Although providing new exemptions from CERCLA liability will
alleviate some of the concerns held by prospective purchasers ofbrownfields,
funds for the cleanup and renewal of these sites must be available to those
who need them to achieve the goal of redeveloping the nation's up to one
million brownfields.'5 6 The Brownfields Act authorizes the annual appro-
priation of up to two hundred million dollars for the assessment and cleanup
of brownfields, and further requires that one quarter of this amount go to the
cleanup of brownfields with petroleum contamination. 57 In addition to
112 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 58, § 14.01(8)(b)(iv) (citation omitted).
"53 Domenic LombardiRealty, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
114 Id. at 332.
155 Id.
156 See Bush, supra note 3, para. 14.
"' Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 104 (discussing section 221).
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private individuals, "States, Tribes, local governments, land clearance
authorities, regional councils, redevelopment agencies and other quasi-
governmental entities created by States or local governments"' " are eligible
to receive brownfields grants. Providing grants to these entities should
encourage state and local governments to establish brownfield redevelopment
programs. Grants of up to two hundred thousand dollars per brownfield site
are authorized for site assessments and planning.'59 To facilitate this site
assessment and planning process, the Brownfields Act creates a training and
research program for those engaged in the cleanup of brownfields 6 °
Similar grants are available to non-profit organizations for the purpose of
cleaning up brownfields owned by the grantee.' 6' The Brownfields Act also
"authorizes grants of up to $1 million to eligible entities to capitalize
revolving loan funds to clean up brownfields.' ' 62 By providing funding to
make financial and technical assistance available to those who wish to
cleanup brownfields, this Act goes further than taking away the whip; it
places a carrot on the stick.
B. State and Local Brownfield Redevelopment Programs
State and local governments can take the first steps toward re-
developing the brownfields that besmirch the landscape with the funding
now available to them. Local governments can facilitate the renewal of
brownfields by "[b]rokering reuse[, p]roviding funding[, c]oordinating
public funding and resources[, a]cting as a liaison with environmental reg-
ulators[, and a]ssuming liability for contamination."'63 States, too, can estab-
lish programs to encourage brownfield redevelopment. 6" As an example,
Virginia established "the Brownfield site assessment program," and "the
Voluntary Remediation Program. ',165 The purpose of the Voluntary Reme-
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 1d.
163 ROSENBERG, supra note 91, at 36 (citing BROwNFIELDs REDEVELOPMENT: A GUIDEBOOK
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITIES, International City/County Management
Association and the Northeast-Midwest Institute (1997)).
'6' See, e.g., id. at 20-35 (discussing Virginia's Site Cleanup and Redevelopment Policy).
161 Id. at 20.
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diation Program is "to encourage hazardous substance cleanups that might
not otherwise take place.' ' 166 The Voluntary Remediation Program works as
follows:
the program allows the owner of a site and the state
government to arrive at a mutually acceptable remedy for the
contamination at the site. This remedy must be one which
will bring the site within specific parameters for cleanliness
with respect to all contaminants. When the [Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality] determines that the
work is complete, the landowner receives a Certification of
Satisfactory Completion of Remediation. This certificate
confers immunity from liability under state enforcement
actions with respect to the contamination the participant
remedied. In turn, the landowner usually must alter its
property deed to limit the property's future use. In addition,
it is possible for landowners ... [who have completed
remediation] to be granted exemption or partial exemption
from local taxes by the municipality.'67
The Virginia program provides incentives, rewards, and assurances to inspire
the cleanup ofbrownfields, and in turn the renewal of the state's urban areas.
For example, the Village at Shirlington Shopping Center in Alexandria,
Virginia was cleaned up under the Voluntary Remediation Program. 6 ' A dry
cleaner previously operated on the site, and as a result, solvent tetrachloro-
ethylene seeped into the groundwater.'69 After the successful completion of
the remediation process, the previously contaminated site was slated for the
construction of an office building. 70 Funding and cooperative programs
offered by state and local governments can achieve the desired public benefit,
the renewal of long unused industrial sites.
Id. (quoting Virginia Dep't. of Envtl. Quality, Voluntary Remediation, at http://www.deq.
state.va.usibrownfields/vrp.html (last updated June 3, 2003)).
167 ROSENBERG, supra note 91, at 20.
168 Id. at 21-22.
'
6 9 Id. at 2 1.
170 Id. at 22.
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VII. CONCLUSION
To a limited extent, critics of the Brownfields Act of 2001 are correct
when they say that both the new provisions and the clarifying amendments
in the Act are overly technical in construction. No matter how technical these
new exemptions and clarifications may be, however, they were adopted after
much debate and by unanimous consent in Congress, with the clear goal of
assisting blameless purchasers of contaminated or possibly contaminated
sites to escape liability under CERCLA. Congress adopted CERCLA in
1980, as a response to the numerous hazardous waste release incidents across
the nation. In what proved to be a glaring omission, Congress did not provide
an exemption from liability in the original act for truly innocent owners of
land who played no part in polluting a contaminated site, whether they knew
about the contamination or not.
Congress attempted to correct this mistake with the adoption of SARA
amendments in 1986, but did so through an indirect method of defining the
contract exception of the third-party defense rather than providing a clear
innocent landowner exception. In light of the non-uniform application of the
"all appropriate inquiry" requirement for the "innocent landowner" defense,
the Brownfield Act's adoption of ASTM Phase I Assessment as the current
"all appropriate inquiry" standard provides a much needed clear standard for
courts to apply. By keeping the same "all appropriate inquiries" test from
SARA for purchases before May 31, 1997, Congress seems to have intended
to protect the expectations of landowners who purchased during this period.
As stated earlier, the application of this standard has proven to be intensely
fact-based and case-specific, providing great uncertainty for landowners
looking for assurance that they will not be subjected to Superfund liability,
and making it exceedingly difficult to escape from CERCLA litigation by
way of summary judgment.
The bona fide prospective purchaser exemption created by the Brown-
fields Act was adopted in an effort to eliminate the need for PPAs. This Act
provides a defense against liability for a conscientious prospective landowner
who performs an ASTM Phase I Assessment, acts to control current
contamination, cooperates with the government in cleaning up the site, and
can prove that no part of the contamination is her fault. Those who purchased
property after May 31, 1997 and inquired into the condition of the property
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in good faith, but did so with a method that did not include all the elements
of an ATSM Phase I Assessment, may still be subjected to CERCLA
liability.
Realistically, prospective landowners have an incentive to engage in
inquiry that exceeds the Brownfields Act interim standard of an ASTM
Phase I Assessment. In order to rely on any of these exemptions, a landowner
will have to demonstrate that he did not contribute to the site contamination.
The easiest way to prove that the level of contamination has not increased is
to test the soil and groundwater for contaminants prior to purchase to
establish a baseline level of contamination. If any contaminants are found,
however, the landowner is relegated to seeking relief under the bona fide
prospective purchaser exemption rather than the "innocent landowner"
exemption, because she would know of the existence of contamination at the
site.
Because these exemptions must be raised as affirmative defenses, land-
owners entitled to relief under these sections will often still have to suffer
some litigation expenses in order to obtain relief. Moreover, such costs
would arise subsequent to purchase. This stands in contrast to the practice of
obtaining pre-transaction Prospective Purchaser Agreements from EPA,
which ensured liability relief through a covenant not to sue in exchange for
cash, cleanup assistance, cooperation with the government, or some other
valuable consideration. Obtaining a PPA could be a difficult and time-
consuming process, extracting from the prospective landowner not only the
costs of negotiation, but also the cost of providing adequate consideration in
the form of other environmentally beneficial actions. If these costs and
delays were born before a transaction took place, they could serve to
discourage prospective purchasers.
The de micromis and contiguous property owner exemptions are also
useful and will provide appropriate relief from liability for parties who have
either suffered the effects of a neighbor's hazardous waste contamination,
or those who dispose of a small amount of waste with an negligible environ-
mental effect. One continuing problem with these new exemptions is the
exclusion from the contiguous property owner exemption of contamination
which leeches through the soil. This is an important omission which still
needs to be remedied to provide adequate relief under the spirit of the law.
The funding grants that the Brownfield Act provides, which can go to
state or local agencies for the purpose of finding and funding brownfield
cleanup and renewal provide the means for redevelopment. State redevelop-
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ment programs like the Virginia Voluntary Remediation Program can
provide incentives in the form of tax breaks to entice developers who already
own a brownfield site to cooperate and clean it up. New exemptions from
liability and clarifications of existing rules provide a level of comfort for
diligent and conscientious prospective purchasers who want to develop
brownfields. But brownfield development would not be possible on the
national level without funding or state and local programs that provide the
means to match prospective purchasers with brownfields and the encourage-
ment to develop the site in the form of tax breaks.
The Brownfield Act amendments were enacted as an attempt to clarify
the existing exemptions and provide necessary additional relief for parties
formerly overlooked by CERCLA's protections. The new provisions,
however, have raised many questions that have yet to be answered and have
created a need for either judicial interpretation or further legislative
correction. In the past, there have been few instances in which landowners
have successfully invoked the exemptions to CERCLA liability as affirm-
ative defenses in litigation. It remains to be seen if the new exemptions and
clarifications will prove to be useable, allowing blameless and conscientious
landowners to obtain relief from CERCLA liability in a cost-effective, even-
handed, and predictable manner. Whether the Brownfields Act keeps the
promises of protecting the innocent made by EPA and President Bush is less
important than whether these new protections will facilitate the redevelop-
ment of more Brownfields and Superfund sites. It looks like the Brownfields
Act just might keep one of President Bush's promises-giving more
prospective purchasers the tools and the confidence to redevelop brownfields.
2003]
